Landrace Squash photos and discussion. William Schlegel. I'm recommending the practice to my followers, and putting my reputation on the line by offering them at.
. 1 Rorty would have done better if he had written about “presentism” instead of “rational reconstructi 1It has become a commonplace that philosophy has a special connection to its history.
This relation has been addressed in various ways, but I will concentrate on one line of conversation, which has concentrated on two methods of reading historical writings: rational and historical reconstructions. These two genres of the historiography of philosophy are often taken as a starting point, even if one goes on to question the confrontation between the two methods. The most influential single article propagating these terms (and perhaps the first to use the exact terminology) is by no doubt Richard Rorty’s seminal article The Historiography of Philosophy: Four Genres published in 1984. This is the article that one refers to when one feels obligated to say something about the methodology of one’s own interpretation of the past thinkers.
Rorty’s article serves indeed as a good starting point. But it does have problems, and while Rorty makes some fine systematic distinctions, he misses the historical dimensions of the methods. And perhaps more importantly, he has actually very little to say about what kind of activity rational reconstruction is. He seems to be more interested in motivation why we should (or should not) do rational reconstructions of past thinkers.
2 By “historicist” I mean hear the variety of approaches to the history of philosophy, which maintain. 3 Of the mentioned authors only Rorty uses the terminology exactly. Danto speaks of his method simply 2In the following, I will first take a look on A.C. Danto’s book Nietzsche as Philosopher as a paradigmatic example of rational reconstruction. Then I will turn to V.
Tejara’s criticism of the work, which I consider to present a paradigmatic example of the historicist criticism of rational reconstruction. Then I shall examine the history of term “rational reconstruction” in its original context and how it shifted in discussions around historiography of philosophy. After that I will turn back to Danto and his book to describe their historical context(s). The last part is an interpretation of Danto’s work in these historical contexts, and I try to explicate Danto’s intentions in “Cambridge school” manner by answering question: what was Danto doing in this book. Finally I make some remarks on the historicist criticism. In other words, my aim is to give an interpretation of Danto, not of Nietzsche, and to cast some light to the notorious method of rational reconstruction by doing a “historical reconstruction” of the method.
4 See Danto 1980: 9-10. This also what he restates in foreword of recently published expanded edition 3Let’s first take a textualist approach to Danto’s work and just start reading the book. In the preface of the Morningside edition Danto explains the title of his book, Nietzsche As Philosopher, by referring to a conversation with a colleague of his, who had assured him that Nietzsche is not really a philosopher but a prosaist. The book is directed to oppose this opinion, and Danto goes on to declare that whatever else Nietzsche was, he certainly was a philosopher. Danto states his aim as a mission to introduce Nietzsche to analytic philosophy. 4Danto tells us that there seems to be two characteristics in Nietzsche’s work that has caused his dismissal among Danto’s colleagues. According to him, the first reason why Nietzsche was not considered a philosopher (among his colleagues) can be found in the structure of Nietzsche’s works.
To them Nietzsche was a bad architect. Nietzsche’s alleged fault was that he didn’t explicate his doctrines in a philosophically coherent and systematic manner. According to Danto Nietzsche’s doctrines are scattered around in a way that it does not really matter from which page one starts to read his books. 5In order to clarify his mission Danto examines the way Nietzsche is using language. Danto says that philosophical lexicon is much closer to ordinary speech than one might expect, and this causes problems when reader expects an ordinary language word in philosophical text to be used in the same meaning as it is normally used in everyday speech. Danto tells us that there is a second, though related, problem that reader has to deal with when reading Nietzsche: he is constantly shifting between philosophical and everyday meaning of the words (and according to Danto, usually Nietzsche is no more aware of his moves than his readers). This habit gives impression that Nietzsche is using concepts in an unconsistent way.
5 Danto 1980: 13. 6These are the two problems that Danto seeks to overcome in order to give Nietzsche philosopher’s status. The object is thus to clarify Nietzsche’s “philosophical language” by showing how the changes in the meanings of the words are not random but coherently dependent in contexts they are used (to show the logical connections between his scattered doctrines) and to organize them into single “philosophically systematic” theory.
By this move, Danto is translating Nietzsche’s philosophy into the systematic and analytic discourse where he thinks the real philosophy lives: had Nietzsche known what he was trying to say «his language would have been less colourful». 7Danto’s conception of philosophy plays major role. He characterizes the nature of philosophy by referring to two «distinct facts». 6 Danto 1984: 24.
Later in an interview with Giovanna Borradori, Danto explicates what he means by ar The first is the systematic nature of philosophy itself. In the character of the philosophical discipline, there is no such thing as an isolated solution to an isolated problem. The problems of philosophy are so interconnected that the philosopher cannot solve or start to solve, one of them without implicitly committing himself to solutions for all the rest The fact remains however, that philosophy as such is architectonic Philosophers are systematic through the nature of their enterprise. 8and secondly.
7 Danto 1984: 25. We are apt to attribute to an author’s unconscious what is in fact in our own knowledge, which he could not have been conscious of because it has to do with the facts which lay not in the depths of his mind but in the future So the unifying forces of historical intelligence work together with the systemizing dynamics of philosophical thought to produce a coherent structure in a writer’s works (his literary style and methods of composition not withstanding), quite independently of whether he ever was able to express it as such, for himself or anyone else.
8 Danto 1984: 26. 9 This is also how he sees Nietzsche to use his aphorisms: to support his hypothesis. 10 Danto 1984: 229. 11 Danto 1984: 230. 9Following these “rules” Danto starts to construct a systematic theory out of collection of aphorisms.
He tells his readers that his interpretation is to be taken as any scientific theory «that is, an instrument for unifying and explaining a domain of phenomena». According to Danto his theory has even got predictive power as it tells us what Nietzsche was going to be saying.
His hypothesis is that Nietzsche was rather a systematic thinker than some other more irrational or spontaneous sort of thinker, and that “nihilism” is the key concept that enables us to see this. He uses Nietzsche’s textual material the same way scientists employ observations, i.e. To support hypothesis. After undressing Nietzsche’s philosophy from all the personal and colourful characteristics and reconstructing his philosophy to a coherent theory, Danto finally concludes that Nietzsche shares to a considerable extent modern analytic perspective and has earned his chair among the philosophers. At the end of his book he hopes that he has «not merely imposed his own will-to-system upon the galaxy of fragments and aphorisms».
Of course there is some irony here, but it seems to be fair to say that Danto thinks that he has not violated Nietzsche’s philosophy in any serious way, that his interpretation is in accordance with basic ideas of Nietzsche’s philosophy or with Nietzsche’s «own concept of philosophical activity». From a historicist point of view this is of course a strange suggestion even though it might be true (if only by change and no thanks to Danto’s skills in historiography or the virtue of his method). 12 Tejera 1989: 1. 10The basic historicist criticism against Danto is that he is being anti-historical in an essentially historical field. A paradigmatic case of historicist criticism is V.
Tejara’s comment on Danto’s books in his (introductory) article On the nature of philosophic historiography. Tejara regards Danto’s anti-historicist attitude as a symptom of larger scale phenomenon of identifying history of philosophy with philosophy itself, which has caused this «denial of historicity of philosophic history as such». Most of all he is blaming philosophers who think of philosophy as applied logic. 13 Tejeta 1989: 1. 11Tejera attacks Danto’s concept of philosophy and he denies the possibility that Danto could have grasped Nietzsche’s conception of philosophical activity. According to him, Danto’s conception of systematic philosophy is theoricist and assertive while Nietzsche’s philosophy is systematic «by reference to cultural practices he is criticizing and to the kind of expressiveness which Nietzsche laboured to achieve».
Tejera argues that Danto should have done some philological or interpretative work on the notion of philosophy instead of showing total ignorance of the history of the concept. Tejera uses Danto as an example, but his real target is the tradition of “logical reconstruction”.
He names three faults that logical reconstructionists necessarily commit. 14 Tejera 1989: 3. Logical reconstruction is incapable of articulating historical thought in its own terms. Logical reconstruction is incapable of perceiving the special modes in which the thinker has developed his meanings when the mode of judgement is other than assertive. The ubiquitous interpretative problem of how to discount the historian’s own point of view as the criterion of the rationality of his subject’s activity and products, is not even present as a problem to the logicalist commentator.
12In other words, the main accusation is that logical reconstructionists have set their interpretational frame in advance, and thus the method does not allow any dialectics between past thinkers and the modern interpreter. Tejera concludes that this missing of dialectics is the anti-historical element of logical reconstruction, and because of it logical reconstruction fails to be self-reflective (which for Tejera means to be unphilosophical). 13It is true that Danto’s interpretation probably offends all the historicist criteria of historical interpretation, and it may well be anachronistic in all the ways described by Quentin Skinner in his famous early article Meaning and understanding in the history of ideas (especially it is parochial regarding it’s conception of philosophy) that has become to be the article of historical reconstruction. From a historicist point of view, at first, it seems very tempting and unproblematic to accept the core of Tejera’s criticism. But we need to ask: does his interpretation live up to his own expectations? Has Tejera expressed Danto’s thought in his own terms? Has Tejera been able “to perceive special mode” in which Danto has developed his meanings?
And is his reading of Danto “dialectic”? To answer these questions we have to first examine Danto’s interpretation in its historical context (a task that Tejera did not perform). 14In order to gain a better understanding of Danto’s work I will first take a look on the historical background of “rational reconstruction”. As I already mentioned, it is possible that Richard Rorty is the first one to use the term “historical reconstruction” with “rational reconstruction” when speaking of historiography of philosophy, but “rational reconstruction” itself does have a longer history. Before the term was shifted into this special discussion it was a common term used in the context of philosophy of science and metaphilosophy. 15 At least according to G.H.
See his Logiika, filosofia ja kieli (1968). But I do not wis 15If one is willing to abstract the meaning of the term enough, one will find something resembling already in the thought of Aristotle when he speaks about the ideal of axiomatic science, about how the scientific knowledge should be rearranged according to a certain ideal form. Perhaps little less abstracting is needed in Descartes’ aim in “translating” geometry into language of algebra, and the Leibniz’s idea of universal language comes perhaps one more step closer to the idea of rational reconstruction, when he speaks of universal language ( characteristica universalis) and of it’s rules ( calculus ratiocinator). But even though all this all fits in with Yagisawa’s definition of “rational reconstruction” in the Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy. 16 Yagisawa 1995: 676.
Rational reconstruction, also called logical reconstruction, translation of a discourse of a certain conceptual type into a discourse of another conceptual type with the aim of making it possible to say everything (or everything important) that is expressible in the former more clearly (or perspicaciously) in the latter. 16It should be noted that historically speaking the term, as in the following will be explained, has got such attributes that it would have been impossible for those past figures to be really rational reconstructionists. 17 This distinction stood up strongly for a while but later on it has been challenged. Hoynin. 18 Reichenbach 1947. 19 See Reichenbach 1938 and 1947.
17As the most famous example of rational reconstruction Yagisawa mentions Rudolf Carnap’s attempt to translate discourse concerning physical objects into discourse concerning immediate objects of sense experience. Carnap’s idea that every meaningful sentence could be defined using concepts of immediate sense experience did not live for long but the idea of exact formal language surely survived later in analytic philosophy. Probably, the first philosopher to use the term “rational reconstruction” before Carnap was Hans Reichenbach. Reichenbach distinguishes context of discovery and contexts of justification. Context of discovery belongs to psychology and context of justification is the proper interest for philosophy of science.
According to Reichenbach a rational reconstruction of a scientific theory presents (or perhaps represents) a scientific theory, by using methods of formal logic, in a form that enables us to see (as clearly as possible) how the hypothesis is supported by evidence. In other words rational reconstruction «constitutes the basis of logical analysis» of a scientific theory in order to decide if the theory in question can be justified. 20 See e.g. Losee 1985: 174. 18Meaningful practise of rational reconstruction is thus based on the assumption that the new discourse expresses more clearly everything of importance of some expression in the first discourse. This kind of activity was central to the logical positivists and the post-war analytic philosophers following them. For instance the members of Vienna Circle considered that one of their essential tasks was to carry out rational reconstruction of scientific knowledge by restating the relations between hypothesis and empirical evidence in scientific theories (like Reichenbach suggested).
In general logical positivists were interested in reformulating scientific theories in the patterns of formal logic, so that the problems of proper area of philosophy of science, namely explanation and confirmation, could be dealt with as problems of applied logic. 21 That is, the individual laws. 22 Losee 1985: 174. 19An important feature of the reconstruction of scientific theories is the idea of hierarchy of scientific language.
The bottom level terms form a semantically unproblematic language of observational data content that is independent of the upper theoretical level. At the bottom level there are statements like “the pointer x is on 5”. Next level statements assign values to scientific concepts like “temperature is 5 C°” and at the following level the (invariant) relations among scientific concepts are formulated. At the top level there are deductive systems (or “scientific theories”) in which laws are theorems. So, the top level theories get their meaning from the bottom level terms or are constructed from them by following the operational correspondence rules.
John Losee has summarised the criteria for ideal scientific theory as follows: 1. Each level is an “interpretation” of level below; 2.
The predictive power of statements increases from base to apex; 3. The principal division within the language of science is between an “observational level” – the bottom of three level hierarchy – and a “theoretical level” – the top level of the hierarchy. The observational level contains statements about “observables” such as “pressure” and “temperature”; the theoretical level contains statements about “non-observables” such as “genes” and “quarks”; 4.
Statements of the observable level provide a test-basis for statements of the theoretical level. 20Losee presents language levels as follows. 23 In this sense, my interpretation of rational reconstruction is just a another among number of diffe 22Before setting Danto’s book in its historical context I will take a quick look at the history of “rational reconstruction” as a method of history of philosophy.
For Carnap the method of rational reconstruction was an instrument to overcome the “pseudoproblems in philosophy”. He applied it to topical issues of his time and was not interested in past thinkers (in effect he hardly mentions any previous philosopher in his work such as in Logical structure of the world). Richard Rorty’s article certainly made famous the distinction between rational and historical reconstruction in the historiography of philosophy, but at least, in the case of the concept of rational reconstruction, the history is longer.
Considering the impact of Rorty’s article, it is somewhat confusing to notice that Rorty has actually very little to say about the methods he writes about. He says a lot about the motives why one wishes to do historical or rational reconstruction and almost nothing about how to actually use these methods. Of course this may just reflect the fact, that we have no common definition of the method of rational or historical reconstruction of history of philosophy.
30 Danto 2005a. 31 Quotation taken from Danto 2005a. 32 Danto 2005a: 18. 26In an essay, published only in Italy, Danto takes a look back at the 60’s when he wrote his book Nietzsche as Philosopher.
To pay attention to past thinkers was a fairly new phenomenon in analytic philosophy at the time, though it had begun in the 50’s. Analytic philosophers may have just turned to history but they wanted to stand out – or at least – differ from historians. It was emphasized that philosophers task, when looking at his or her predecessors, differs from the job of historian of ideas. As Danto reminds us, «the main qualification for writing on a past philosopher was that one had established credibility as a contemporary philosopher». Paul Edward, who was editor of Macmillan Encyclopedia of Philosophy had another project, that was later published as Critical History of Western Philosophy, invited Danto to write a piece on Nietzsche for the Critical History.
O’Conner, editor of this book, invited writers to contribute this new book in order to «explain the principle philosophical concepts and theories in the order in which they were developed; and to evaluate and criticize them in the light of contemporary knowledge and to bring out whatever may be in them that is of permanent philosophical interest». And Danto himself puts it even more clearly: «the main task was to scrub their writings clean of historical excrescence, and to present them very much as if they might be candidates for tenure in a good respectable philosophy department in a Midwest university». This is how Danto later on describes the starting point of his work. However, it turned out, that Danto’s essay on Nietzsche should be shortened in half but if he wanted to enlarge it to a book, he would get a contract.
And so he wrote Nietzsche as Philosopher from the basis of an essay that was first meant to be published in a collection of essays. 33 Nowdays he probably calls himself rather a post-analytic philosopher. See his intereview in «Radica. 34 Danto 1980: 13. 35 It is perhaps self-evident that it was only in Danto’s context (analytic philosophy on both sides o 27Danto’s own starting point is in the department of philosophy of Colombia University. It is not groundbreaking news that Danto is or was an analytic philosopher, and that the polemics or irony of the title of his book comes understandable only in the context of American philosophy of 60’s and 50’s.
As I already mentioned the name of the book refers to a conversation with Danto’s colleague, who didn’t consider Nietzsche much of a philosopher. However the irony is not directed to analytic philosophers who had not paid any attention to Nietzsche, but to those philosophers who had spent their lives with Nietzsche and interpreting him as some sort of non-analytic philosopher. The name bravely declares that nobody before the author of the new book had examined Nietzsche as a genuine philosopher, especially not the «poets, politicians, potheads, and photographers from Princeton» who had not training in analytical philosophy. 41 It could be argued that Danto’s essential concept of philosophy is dubious but on the same grounds. 42 Danto indeed describes his book to be based more on reading than on research. See Danto 2005a: 22. 43 Danto 2005a: 22.
44 Danto 2005a: 21. This of course applies to readers of philosophy within the branch of analytic phil 31If Danto’s interpretation offers no interesting information to a historian, it is not due to a failure. It is obvious that Danto is not trying to uncover the historical meaning of Nietzsche’s work (at least in the sense Tejera is criticizing him failing in).
He is exercising philosophy as it was understood in the tradition of logical positivists and (partly) in the later analytic tradition: he is clarifying a theory. In this case, the act of philosophizing is directed towards a historical phenomenon but the interest is not historical. The aim of his reading of Nietzsche was to provide an interpretation of his work that would make Nietzsche a philosopher worth reading for analytic philosophers: to make him «one of us» and in this he was successful. As he himself has put it: «my book made it possible for those who read philosophy also to read Nietzsche without guilt».
32The fact that philosophers who write about past thinkers do not always share the same intentions that historians do is a point that is sometimes forgotten in the historicist criticism of Danto and in the rational reconstruction in general. And I think that it is a crucial mistake for a historicist, like Tejara, not to pay attention to the intentions of given author. It doesn’t matter that Tejera is not commenting on a past thinker, or that the book was written only 14 years before Tejera’s criticism was published.
The same interpretational principles apply to any strange culture, not only those that have become history. As Tejara calls for historicity of history of philosophy and denies historicity of historiography of philosophy by his essential conception of the field, his criticism seems to be more of a moral sort and only disguised in epistemological form.
Residence Albuquerque, New Mexico, U.S. Nationality American Alma mater Occupation Known for Marshall Rosenberg (October 6, 1934 – February 7, 2015) was an American, mediator, author and teacher. Starting in the early 1960s he developed, a process for supporting partnership and resolving conflict within people, in relationships, and in society. He worked worldwide as a peacemaker and in 1984 founded the, an international for which he served as Director of Educational Services. According to his biographer, Marjorie C.
Witty, 'He has a fierce face- even when he smiles and laughs. The overall impression I received was of intellectual and emotional intensity. He possesses a charismatic presence.' Contents. Family Rosenberg was born in.
His parents were Jean (Weiner) Rosenberg and Fred Rosenberg. Rosenberg's grandmother Anna Satovsky Wiener had nine children. Though living in impoverished circumstances, she kept a, taking in people in need. She loved to dance and was a model to Julius, her son-in-law. His grandfather worked at, and his grandmother taught workers' children to dance. In his father loaded trucks with wholesale grocery stock, and Rosenberg went to a three-room school.
Jean Rosenberg was a professional with tournaments five nights a week. She was also a gambler with high-stakes backers. His parents divorced twice, once when Rosenberg was three, and when he left home. The family moved to, Michigan one week prior to the when 34 people were killed and 433 wounded. At an inner-city school Rosenberg discovered anti-Semitism and internalized it. 'Growing up as a kid, I couldn’t stand to see people torment other people.'
He developed a 'kind of awareness of suffering – why do people do this – and particularly, why does it have to happen to me?' 'My family was very affectionate.
I got heaps of love, and if it had not been for that, the effects of this self-hatred could have been much harder to deal with.' His maternal grandmother, Anna Satovsky Wiener, was dying of in the dining room, cared for by Uncle Julius and his mother. His parents were also caring for his grandfather and aunt.
Rosenberg hid under the porch and learned to be invisible. Uncle Julius projected a model of compassion in the care for his maternal grandmother (Julius's mother-in-law). Julius was a pharmacist with a drugstore on Woodward Avenue. His brother was seven years younger, outgoing and precocious, attracting attention.
Rosenberg stood up to defend him and suffered in fights. The brothers were estranged for a 44-year interval. 'My brother is like my mother is like my wife Gloria.
They stir things up everywhere they go. Now I love that characteristic in all of them, but.' Rosenberg explained, 'I was in the hospital a lot, though from sports, violent ones that I was good at, probably more than fights.'
Summer camp instilled a love of nature: 'My safety requires a high-density of trees and a low density of people.' Rosenberg married his first wife, Vivian, in 1961. They had three children.
In 1974, he married his second wife, Gloria, whom he divorced in 1999. He married his third wife, Valentina (a.k.a.Kidini) in 2005, with whom he remained until his death in 2015.
Education After Rosenberg's father bought a house in a better neighborhood Rosenberg attended and graduated in 1952 as. A neighbor boy Clayton Lafferty first mentioned psychology to Rosenberg. He wrote a high school term paper on. 'I did an honours program as an undergraduate, and my professor’s father, who was a, got me an opportunity to see what psychology is really like in prison.'
When considering medicine as a career he worked with an for a while to measure his interest in the human body. At age 13 he began but got expelled. Twice his father beat Rosenberg, once so badly he missed school the next day.
Rosenberg's first college was. With money earned he entered the; and, he worked as a waiter at a sorority and a cook's help at a fraternity. He fell in love with a Catholic girl who wanted him to convert. Putting up with, he graduated in three years.
The paid for Rosenberg's training as a. Rosenberg recommended book Freedom to Learn. 'Of the twenty-seven of us in our first year class at Wisconsin, only three got through – not the ones with the qualities you would want them to have. I got through because I had been through worse in Detroit.'
: 752 Professor Michael Hakeem Rosenberg when he indicated that psychology and psychiatry were dangerous in that scientific and value judgments were mixed in the fields. Hakeem also had Rosenberg read about traditional in which clients were seen as down on their luck rather than sick. Rosenberg was influenced by the 1961 books by. He also remembered reading on 'Psychotherapy as a learning process'. Rosenberg's placements were the Wisconsin Diagnostic Center, schools for delinquent girls and boys,. There psychiatrist Bernie Banham 'would never have it where we would talk about a client in his absence.'
In Mendota Rosenberg began to practice with all parties present, including children. After graduation, Rosenberg worked in Winnebago with Gordon Filmer-Bennett for a year to fulfill his obligation to the state for his graduate training. Practice. Marshall Rosenberg lecturing in a Nonviolent Communication workshop (1990) Rosenberg showed a need to explore and try out different things: 'Ask. He asked me to be on his research project because he wanted many people doing many different things.'
In 1961, Rosenberg received his in from the. His, Situational Structure and Self-evaluation, prefigured certain key aspects of his later work with Nonviolent Communication by focusing on 'the relationship between (the) structure of social situations and two dimensions of self evaluation; positive self evaluation and certainty of self evalution'. In 1966 he was awarded Diplomate status in clinical psychology from the American Board of Examiners in Professional Psychology.
Rosenberg started out in clinical practice in, forming Psychological Associates with partners. In making an analysis of problems of children in school, he found.
He wrote his first book, Diagnostic Teaching, in 1968, reporting his findings. He also met Al Chappelle, a leader in the Zulu 1200s. Rosenberg went to teach his approach to conflict resolution to the gang in exchange for Chappelle appearing at desegregation conventions, starting in Washington, D.C. While Chappelle was harnessing communication against, Vicki Legion began to collaborate to counter. 'I started to give my services, instead of to individual affluent clients, to people on the firing line like Al and Vicki, and others fighting in behalf of human rights of various groups.' The, Thomas Shaheen, in called upon Rosenberg to deal with conflicts in an that was established. In 1970 Shaheen became superintendent of schools in and was charged with racially integrating the city’s schools.
He called on Rosenberg to help as before and Rosenberg organized a group but Shaheen was dismissed before it could come into action. Rosenberg decided to stay in California and promoted the Community Council for Mutual Education with the help of Vicki Legion. NVC 'evolved out of my practice with people who were hurting, and experimenting with what might be of value to them, whether they be in the correctional school for girls, or people labeled schizophrenic.' : 783 The San Francisco experience gave me the exciting concept that we could start local projects to train masses of people in the skills, quickly and with no money.: 793 He worked for four years in ’s school integration. As a caricature of his program in street talk he offered this version, spoken to himself:: 813 Thug, identify observable behaviour. Identify feeling.
Identify reason for feeling. Identify wants.
Put that out. Make sure other person connects with it. And thug, you’ll know a miracle start to happen after a bit.
About 1982 Rosenberg spent his last $55 for admission to Midwest Radical Therapy Conference, which was the 'best investment I ever made because I met people and made connections that I still have.' The importance of strokes of appreciation or affirmation, between communicants, had been emphasized for instance by adherents to. 'My workshops before this time used a language of and talked about getting power with people and stuff like that.
They focused entirely on helping people deal with behaviors that were painful to them and finding ways of changing them. There was nothing about celebrating with people or affirming each other, or the words 'nurturance' or 'compassion'.' Rosenberg says the program led to the femininization of the program (beyond conflict). Rosenberg was called to many states, countries, and conflicts to provide his expertise in. In 2004 he was visiting about 35 countries per year on his mission as a travelling peacemaker.
Rosenberg enjoyed success in his work: Such incredible things happen when I leave groups, so that when I go back, I can hardly believe what they’ve accomplished in the time since I was last there. I see this everywhere I go. The people I work with want to radiate this process and transform things. They want everyone to have access to these principles, and they have enormous energy for spreading this kind of work. From his home base at, Rosenberg supported his followers elsewhere with a Center of Nonviolent Communication there in. He died at home on February 7, 2015. The Center has continued, after Rosenberg’s death, connecting people all over the world to certified NVC trainers nearby.
According to cognitive therapist, Ted Crawford, who co-authored the book Making Intimate Connections with Ellis, 'particularly liked the anger-resisting philosophy of Marshall Rosenberg and made presentations on it.' Awards. 2014: Hero and Champion of Forgiveness Award. 2006:. 2005: Light of God Expressing in Society Award from the. 2004: Religious Science International Golden Works Award.
2004: International Peace Prayer Day Man of Peace Award by the. 2002: Princess Anne of England and Chief of Police Restorative Justice Appreciation Award. 2000: International Listening Association Listener of the Year Award Bibliography. (2015) Nonviolent Communication: A Language of Life. (264 pages) Third Edition. Encinitas, CA: PuddleDancer Press. (2012) Living Nonviolent Communication: Practical Tools to Connect and Communicate Skillfully in Every Situation.
(288 pages; compilation of prior short works). (2005) Being Me, Loving You: A Practical Guide to Extraordinary Relationships. (80 pages). (2005) Practical Spirituality: The Spiritual Basis of Nonviolent Communication. (32 pages).
(2005) Speak Peace in a World of Conflict: What You Say Next Will Change Your World. (240 pages) Encinitas, CA: PuddleDancer Press. (2005) The Surprising Purpose of Anger: Beyond Anger Management: Finding the Gift. (48 pages).
(2004) Getting Past the Pain Between Us: Healing and Reconciliation Without Compromise. (48 pages). (2004) The Heart of Social Change: How to Make a Difference in Your World. (45 pages). (2004) Raising Children Compassionately: Parenting the Nonviolent Communication Way.
(48 pages). (2004) Teaching Children Compassionately: How Students and Teachers Can Succeed with Mutual Understanding (41 pages). (2004) We Can Work It Out: Resolving Conflicts Peacefully and Powerfully.
(32 pages). (2003) Life-Enriching Education: NVC Helps Schools Improve Performance, Reduce Conflict and Enhance Relationships. (192 pages) Encinitas, CA: PuddleDancer Press. (2003) Nonviolent Communication: A Language of Life.
(222 pages) Second Edition. Encinitas, CA: PuddleDancer Press. (1999) Nonviolent Communication: A Language of Compassion. (166 pages) First Edition. Encinitas, CA: PuddleDancer Press.
(1986) Duck Tales and Jackal Taming Hints. (Out of Print).
(1983) A Model for Nonviolent Communication. (35 pages) Philadelphia, PA: New Society Publishers.
(1972) A Manual for 'Responsible' Thinking and Communicating. (55 pages) St. Lois, MI: Community Psychological Consultants. (1972) Mutual Education: Toward Autonomy and Interdependence. Bernie Straub Publishing Co. (Out of Print).
(1968) Diagnostic Teaching Special Child Publications (Out of Print) References. ^ Rosenberg, Marshall B.
Nonviolent Communication: A Language of Life (2nd ed.). Encinitas, CA: PuddleDancer Press. ^ Marjorie C. Witty (1990) Life History Studies of Committed Lives, Vol.
3, Chapter 7, page 717, 'Marshall Rosenberg', UMI Dissertation Information Service, Ann Arbor, Michigan. News Network Anthroposophy Limited. Freedom to Learn: A View of What Education Might Become.
(1st ed.) Columbus, Ohio: Charles Merill. Rosenberg, Marshall B. A Model for Nonviolent Communication. Philadelphia, PA: New Society Publishers. The Zulu 1200s being an organization involved in the Black Liberation movement. See the Google Books summary for.
^ Kabatznick, R. Cullen (2004) Inquiring Mind, Fall issue.
Albuquerque Journal. Retrieved 20 Feb 2015. Joffe-Ellis, Albert Ellis with Debbie (2010). All out!: an autobiography. Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books. External links.